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Abstract. In this paper we study one-round key-agreement protocols analogous to Merkle’s puzzles
in the random oracle model. The players Alice and Bob are allowed to query a random permutation
oracle n times and upon their queries and communication, they both output the same key with high
probability. We prove that Eve can always break such a protocol by querying the oracle O(n2) times.
The long-time unproven optimality of the quadratic bound in the fully general, multi-round scenario
has been shown recently by Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary. The results in this paper have been found
independently of their work.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we find a tight upper bound on the number of queries needed to break a key-
agreement protocol in the random oracle model. Key-agreement protocols called Merkle’s puzzles
were constructed by Ralph Merkle in 1974 but only published in 1978 [1]. They are one of the
earliest examples of public-key cryptographic protocols.
The key-agreement ala Merkle between Alice and Bob proceeds as follows: Alice constructs a
large number of puzzles, each of them being possible to solve with Bob’s computational resources.
In other words, all of them are in the form of an encrypted message with an unknown key that
is short enough to allow for a brute force attack. After receiving the message from Alice, Bob
chooses one puzzle uniformly at random and solves it. The solution contains an identifier and a
key. Bob encrypts the identifier with the key, and announces it back to Alice. The solution of
the puzzle solved by Bob becomes Alice’s and Bob’s secret key. Since the puzzle’s identifier is
sent to Alice as a message encrypted with a key that is unknown to Eve, the eavesdropper’s best
strategy to attack such a protocol is to solve as many puzzles as possible. To achieve constant
probability of success, Eve has to solve a constant fraction of them, which might require much
more computational power than what is needed by the legitimate players.
In a similar way we construct a key-agreement protocol in the random oracle scenario, where
the computational difficulty of a key-agreement protocol is expressed by the number of oracle
queries that Alice and Bob make in order to agree on a secret key. Instead of creating many
puzzles, Alice queries the oracle in many positions that are unknown to both Bob and Eve, and
sends the images of the queried elements to Bob. Bob queries the oracle in sufficiently many
positions to get a collision with Alice’s set of queries with high probability. He recognizes the
collision from Alice’s message and reports it back to Alice by its identifier – the oracle image. The
pre-image becomes Alice’s and Bob’s secret key. In addition to only few queries, the communication
gives Eve a little information about the key, since the oracle is random. With the same number
of queries as Bob, she would find a collision with Alice’s set of queries with high probability, but
not necessarily the one found by Bob. Hence, finding the right element might require significantly
more oracle queries than Alice and Bob needed to agree on the key.
Until recently, the best upper bound on Eve’s number of queries needed to break such protocols
have been shown by Impagliazzo and Rudich [2]. They prove that in any key-agreement protocol
based on a random-permutation oracle, where Alice and Bob agree on the secret key in n rounds
in such a way that they query only one query per round (normal form of a protocol), Eve needs at
most O(n3) oracle queries to output a secret key guess that matches with Bob’s secret key with
the same probability as Alice’s key does. For a protocol in the general form, O(n6) are sufficient
for an attack, which can be proven by showing that any protocol can be transformed into its
normal form with at most quadratic blow-up in the number of oracle queries made by the players.
In [2], the question is studied in the larger context to show that possibility of secure key-agreement
relative to some random permutation oracle implies P 6= NP. In other words, proofs for showing
that existence of one-way functions implies existence of secure key-agreement do not relativize.
The bound from [2] has been improved recently by Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary [3] who
show that in fact, O(n2) are sufficient for Eve’s attack.
In our paper we deal with one-round key-agreement protocols where Alice and Bob query the
oracle a and b times, respectively. Such protocols form a subset of protocols whose normal form
consists of a+ b rounds. We prove the tight – O((a+ b)2) upper bound on the number of queries
Eve needs to break the protocol.
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation: χA denotes the characteristic function
of set A, E(X) denotes the mean value of random variable X, and Ec(X) denotes the mean value
of X, conditioned on information c.
2 One-Round Key-Agreement Protocols
In this section, we model one round key-agreement protocols between Alice and Bob. We as-
sume that Alice, Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve have access to an oracle computing a random
permutation f on {1, . . . , n}. We define a one-round key-agreement protocol as follows:
Protocol 1
Given n ∈ N and an oracle computing a random permutation f on {1, . . . , n},
1. Alice queries the oracle f in positions A1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}≤a, computes a message cA and sends it
to Bob.
2. Bob, given cA, queries the oracle f in positions B ∈ {1, . . . , n}≤b, computes message cB and
sends it to Alice. Bob generates the secret key kB ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, kB = gB(B, f(B), c = (cA, cB), RB),
where RB denotes his local randomness.
3. Alice, given c, queries the oracle in positions A2 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that for A := A1 ∪ A2,
|A| ≤ a, and generates the secret key kA ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, kA = gA(A, f(A), c, RA), where RA denotes
her local randomness.
We denote by (a, b, ε)–key-agreement any one-round key-agreement protocol defined as above
and satisfying the following condition: Pr [kA 6= kB ] ≤ ε where ε < 1 is a constant.
Notice that a and b are functions of n, but for simplicity we refer to them by a and b, instead
of using a(n) and b(n), if the latter one is not explicitly needed. Since key-agreement protocols
take place between players Alice and Bob sharing no initial secret, the key generation mechanism
must involve only common queries to the oracle f . We say that Eve breaks the protocol if she
outputs a string that agrees with Bob’s key with the same probability as Alice does.
Lemma 2.1. In order to break an (a, b, ε)–key-agreement protocol it is sufficient for Eve to query
all intersection queries of Alice and Bob used for the generation of Alice’s secret key.
Proof. Eve querying all elements in A1 ∩ B can construct a permutation f ′ matching with f on
E (Eve’s queries), and a set A′1 of queries to the oracle computing f ′ such that cA = cA′1 and
f ′ is consistent with cB . Therefore, after querying B, Bob has exactly the same view about A1
as he has about A′1. Eve constructs the set A′2 according to A′1 and c, and then “queries” the
f ′-oracle on the positions in A′2. Finally, she generates her secret key kE = gA(A′, f(A′), c, RA′),
where A′ := A′1 ∪A′2. From Bob’s point of view, both kE and kA are generated from the same set
K ⊆ A ∩ B, i.e. Pr[kB = kE ] = Pr[kB = kA]. ⊓⊔
3 Proof of the Quadratic Upper Bound
We will consider the following attack of an (a, b, ε)–key-agreement protocol:
1. Eve repeats Bob’s querying strategy γa times for some constant γ (i.e. makes γab oracle
queries) in order to query all queries in A1 ∩ B with constant probability
2. Eve extracts the position of the A2-queries from cB and queries the oracle on these positions
(a oracle queries)
Next we prove that with the proposed strategy Eve breaks the protocol with constant proba-
bility.
Lemma 3.1. By repeating Bob’s strategy independently 5a times, Eve finds all elements in A1∩B
with constant probability.
Proof. Let A and B denote the random variables associated with Alice querying the elements
in A1 and Bob querying the elements in B, respectively. Let E denote the random variable
associated with the set of Eve’s queries E . W.l.o.g., assume that for x, y ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x ≤ y,
PχB(x)|cA(1) ≤ PχB(y)|cA(1).
Define A01 := A1, B0 := B, A0 = A, B0 := B, s0 := EcA(|A1 ∩ B|), and n0 := n. In the i-th
step, define ni+1, Ai+11 , Bi+1, Ai+1, Bi+1, si+1 in order to satisfy the following:
∀x ∈ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni} : PχB(x)|cA(1) ≥
si
2a
,
Ai+11 := A1 \ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , n}, Bi+1 := B \ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , n}, let Ai+1, Bi+1 denote the corre-
sponding random variables, and set si+1 := E
cA(|Ai+11 ∩Bi+1|).
Furthermore, consider u such that
Pr[A1 ∩ B ⊆ {nu + 1, . . . , n}|cA] ≥ 1
2
.
First, we prove that
1. there exists u ∈ N with the desired property
2. ni+1 < ni for i ∈ {0, . . . , u− 1}
3. si − si+1 ≥ 1 for i ∈ {0, . . . , u− 1}
4. su ≥ 1
We can write:
si = E
cA(|Ai1 ∩Bi|) =
∑
A,|A|≤a
PAi|cA(A)
∑
B,|B|≤b
PA∩Bi|cA(|A ∩ B|) (1)
hence, there exists at least one A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}≤a such that ∑B,|B|≤b PA∩Bi|cA(|A ∩ B| ≥ si.
Let us choose one such A¯. Then
si ≤
∑
B,|B|≤b
PA¯∩Bi|cA(B)(|A¯∩B| =
∑
B,|B|≤b
∑
x∈|A¯∩B|
PBi|cA(B) =
∑
x∈A¯
∑
B: x∈A¯∩B
PBi|cA(B) =
∑
x∈A¯
Pχ
Bi
(x)|cA(1).
Since |A¯| ≤ a, there is an x ∈ {1, . . . , ni} such that Pχ
Bi
(x)|cA(1) ≥ sia . If we remove x ∈
{1, . . . , ni} such that Pχ
Bi
(x)|cA(1) ≥ si2a , then si+1 ≤ si2 .
Since in every step we remove at least one x ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the procedure terminates after
finitely many steps and therefore, u is well-defined and is at most n. Clearly, for si < 1 we have
Pr[Ai+11 ∩ Bi+1 = ∅|cA] > 12 , implying that with probability at least 1/2 we have A1 ∩ B ⊆
{ni + 1, . . . , n}. Therefore su ≥ 1 and for i ∈ {0, . . . , u− 1} :
si − si+1 ≥ si
2
≥ su−1
2
≥ 1.
We finish the proof of the statement by showing that by repeating Bob’s strategy 5a times
independently, Eve queries all elements in A1 ∩ B with probability at least 1/8.
For x ∈ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni}, Eve does not query x with probability
PχE(x)|cA(0) ≤
(
1− si
2a
)a ≤ e−si/2.
That means that in the case where
|Ai1 ∩ Bi ∩ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni}| ≤
esi/2
2s2i
,
the probability that Eve does not query at least one element in {ni+1, . . . , ni} ∩ Ai1 ∩ Bi is
Pr

 ∏
x∈{ni+1,...,ni}∩Ai1∩B
i
χE(x) = 0|cA

 ≤ esi/2
2s2i
· e−si/2 = 1
2s2i
.
Since the expected number of elements in Ai1 ∩ Bi ∩ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni} is si, Markov’s inequality
implies that this happens with probability at most
2s3i
esi/2
. Hence, there exists i, 0 ≤ i < u, such
that |Ai1 ∩ Bi ∩ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni}| > e
si/2
2s2i
with probability at most
∑u
i=0
2s3i
esi/2
. The function 2x
3
ex/2
is decreasing for x ≥ 6, yielding
u′−1:su′≥6∑
i=0
2s3i
esi/2
≤
u′−1:su′≥6∑
i=0
(si − si+1) 2s
3
i
esi/2
≤
∫ ∞
x=su′
2x3
ex/2
dx.
Then for su′ ≥ 28 we obtain:
u′−1:su′≥28∑
i=0
2s3i
esi/2
<
1
8
.
Furthermore, for si < 28 (there are at most 5 of them, since si+1 ≤ si/2 and su ≥ 1), the
probability that Ai1 ∩ Bi ∩ {ni+1 + 1, . . . , ni} contains more than 40si elements is at most 1/40,
by Markov’s inequality.
The probability that there exists an i, 0 ≤ i < u such that
|A1 ∩B ∩ {ni+1, . . . , ni}| > max{40si, e
si/2
2s2i
}
is therefore at most 18 +
5
40 =
1
4 . If this happens, we say that A1 ∩ B has a “bad structure” for
finding all its elements by Eve.
It is sufficient for Eve to repeat Bob’s algorithm (log 80 + 3 log si)a/si ≤ 5a times to get all
elements in A1 ∩ B ∩ {ni+1, . . . , ni}, i ≥ u′, assuming that there are no more than 40si of them,
with probability at least 1− 1
2s2i
.
In other words, with 5a independent iterations of Bob’s strategy, Eve does not query at least
one element of well-structured A1 ∩ B ∩ {nu + 1, . . . , n} = A1 ∩ B with probability
Pr

 ∏
x∈{nu+1,...,n}∩A1∩B
χE(x) = 0|CA

 ≤ 1
2
·
u∑
i=0
1
s2i
≤
u−1∑
i=0
(si − si+1) · 1
2s2i
+
1
2s2u
≤ 1
2
·
∫ ∞
x=su
dx
x2
=
1
2su
≤ 1
2
.
Since A1 ∩ B ( {nu + 1, . . . , n} with probability at most 12 , and A1 ∩ B is ill-structured with
probability at most 14 , A1 ∩ B ⊆ {nu + 1, . . . , n} and is well-structured with probability at least
1
4 . In this case Eve queries all intersection elements with probability at least
1
2 hence, Eve finds
all intersection queries of A1 and B with probability at least 18 . ⊓⊔
Theorem 3.2. Eve can break an (a, b, ε)–key-agreement protocol with O((a + b)2) queries with
constant probability.
Proof. As we claim in the proof of Lemma 2.1, Eve querying all elements in A1 ∩ B needs at
most |A2| ≤ a queries more to generate the key that matches with Bob’s secret key with the
same probability as Alice’s key does. Lemma 3.1 shows that Eve can always query all elements
in A1 ∩ B with probability 1/8 with at most 5ab queries. Therefore, Eve can break the protocol
with constant probability with 5ab+ a ∈ O((a+ b)2) oracle queries. ⊓⊔
4 Optimality of the Bound
Consider the following protocol:
Protocol 2
1. Alice chooses a set A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, |A| = a = ⌈√n⌉ uniformly at random, queries the oracle
for the elements of A, and sends cA = {f(x) : x ∈ A} to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a set B ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, |B| = b = ⌈√n⌉ uniformly at random, queries the elements
of B, chooses a collision element k ∈ {f(y) : y ∈ B} ∩ cA at random, and sends cB = {f(k)}
to Alice. He outputs the key k.
3. Alice recognizes k according to cB and A, and outputs the key k.
Attack: With a constant probability, Bob finds at least one collision with Alice’s set of queries
due to the birthday paradox, and therefore, the given protocol is an example of (
√
n,
√
n, ε)-key-
agreement protocol for some constant ε < 1. Given just c, the secret key is uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . , n} and furthermore, since the oracle is random, Eve knowing the oracle image for only o(n)
elements still has (1−o(1)) log n entropy about f(x) for x /∈ E . Hence, Eve has to query the oracle
in Θ(n) positions to get the right secret key with constant probability, implying that the optimal
Eve’s strategy to break the protocol with constant probability must involve O(n) = O((a + b)2)
oracle queries.
5 Conclusion
We provided an analysis of the most commonly considered attack of these type of key-agreement
protocols where the attacker iterates the players’ strategies with gradually updated information
in the case of one-round protocols. Originally, we were hoping to generalize the result to apply in
the multi-round scenario, which has been done very recently by Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary.
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